The Left: The Most Astonishing Comeback of 2025

When was the last time there was a celebratory atmosphere at an election night for Die Linke? Perhaps in 2019, when the party became the strongest force in Thuringia under Bodo Ramelow. That was a long time ago.

On this February 23, 2025, a thoroughly revamped Die Linke has made a phenomenal comeback. With voter turnout rising significantly to 83.1 percent (2021: 76.4 percent), Die Linke secured 7.9 percent of the first votes (3.9 million votes) and 8.7 percent of the second votes (4.355 million votes). This nearly tripled the party’s polling numbers at the start of the federal election campaign.

With the Silberlocken strategy, Die Linke aimed to win three constituencies, retain Lichtenberg, and reclaim Leipzig II. The goal was achieved, albeit with some surprising changes. Die Linke won direct mandates in six constituencies (four in Berlin, one in Saxony, one in Thuringia).

In Berlin, Die Linke became the strongest party, securing 22.2 percent of the second votes and 20.1 percent of the first votes. With the exception of Bavaria, the party received more than 5 percent of the first votes in every federal state. In terms of second votes, Die Linke achieved double-digit results not only in Berlin but also in Thuringia (15.2 percent), Bremen and Hamburg (14.8 and 14.4 percent, respectively), and in Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Saxony, and Saxony-Anhalt, each slightly above 10 percent. In the remaining states, it ranged between 5 and just over 8 percent.

To fully grasp the scale of this outcome, but also to contextualize the success of this election night and identify areas where work still needs to be done despite the euphoria, a look back is necessary. Even at the risk of seeming like the unwelcome party crasher.

Federal Election 2021: On the Brink of Catastrophe

The day after the 2021 federal election, there was no joy for Die Linke—only a sobering morning after. Losing two million votes compared to 2017 was a bitter pill to swallow. Only three directly won constituencies prevented the absolute worst-case scenario: the party disappearing from the German Bundestag altogether.

 

Die Linke in Comparison: Federal Election 2021 and 2017
Absolute Votes		Difference	Percentage of Votes		Difference	Seats
2017	2021	+/-	2017	2021	+/-	2017	2021
4.297.270	2.269.818	47,2 %	9,2	4,9	-4,3 %	69	39
Source: Own compilation

 

The significant loss of votes in 2021 reflected a fundamental strategic and substantive crisis within the party, which also manifested in its leadership. Nearly half of Die Linke voters in 2021 (46 percent) and more than two-thirds (70 percent) of all voters in the previous federal election believed that Die Linke no longer had convincing leadership figures. The key figures of the party represented, both internally and externally, a faction-ridden party that was increasingly at a loss for direction.

Tactical missteps were not isolated incidents but rather a symptom of deep-seated uncertainty regarding Die Linke’s positioning. The strategic promise made four years earlier—to vote the CDU out of government with Die Linke as an alternative—lacked authenticity. There was no clear consensus on whether the party would be willing to take on governing responsibility if needed. This became particularly evident in a parliamentary vote on the military security of the Afghanistan withdrawal, where Die Linke appeared divided, ineffective, and politically paralyzed.

In the party’s key competency areas, such as social justice (-5 percentage points), fair wages (-5 percentage points), and pensions (-3 percentage points), Die Linke saw a decline according to data from Infratest dimap. In 2017, 53 percent of voters believed that Die Linke stood up most strongly for the socially disadvantaged. By 2021, only 43 percent of Die Linke voters still felt the party was the strongest advocate for social equity.

What was missing was a clear, long-term vision that connected the concerns of low-income populations with the demands of social-ecological and digital transformation.

Adding to this was a general sense of ambivalence among the electorate. According to the 2021 election study by the Rheingold Institute, many voters withdrew into their "shells," feeling overwhelmed by global and national challenges such as the climate crisis and the devastating floods. A dilemma of feasibility emerged: on the one hand, there was recognition of the need for major change; on the other hand, people recoiled from the restrictions that such change might entail. Candidates were not perceived as strong enough to navigate these challenges, leading to a mix of disappointment and relief—disappointment due to a lack of leadership and relief that no single figure could harness the pressure for change.

In this climate, according to the Rheingold Institute, Die Linke was "simply not on the radar for many voters, and the party seemed to lack a coherent strategy to address the feasibility dilemma." The study further noted:

"Even among Die Linke voters, the party’s leadership remains largely unknown. Many still associate Die Linke with Gregor Gysi or Sahra Wagenknecht. Overall, the party appears directionless and leaderless. Only core voters remain firmly committed to Die Linke. Some policy proposals, such as the €13 minimum wage, do resonate with voters, but the party often comes across as 'intellectually detached from reality' or 'ideologically obstinate.' Rather than inspiring hope for social justice, it tends to fuel fears of loss. A redistribution policy that many potential Die Linke voters see as necessary is currently overshadowed by concerns over weakening Germany’s economy.”

In the 2021 federal election, 44 percent of Infratest dimap respondents said they knew exactly what Die Linke stood for (compared to 56% for the Greens, 42% for the CDU/CSU, and 41% for the SPD). However, only about a third (36 percent) believed that Die Linke was honest before the election about what it intended to implement afterward. In terms of perceived honesty regarding its own policies, Die Linke dropped by four percentage points compared to 2017.

The Infratest dimap data also highlighted regional differences. In the five eastern German states, Die Linke achieved double-digit results only in Thuringia (11.4 percent) and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania (11.1 percent). In Brandenburg, it trailed behind the Greens (8.5 percent vs. 9.0 percent). On average, Die Linke garnered only 9.8 percent in the eastern states. These figures made it clear that the party’s traditional voter base in the East was eroding.

2024: The Year of Defeat

In the fall of 2023, Sahra Wagenknecht finally founded her own party, the Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht (BSW).

Her handling of her former party and the Bundestag faction to which she belonged until the very end increasingly resembled that of a flatmate who had already decided to move out and stopped paying rent but continued raiding the shared fridge while badmouthing her roommates and warning potential new tenants with harsh words.

For Die Linke, the split was, as I analyzed at the time, “a painful loss and a liberation at the same time. The reason for the final break between Sahra Wagenknecht and the party she had shaped since the early 1990s, with which she had maintained a difficult relationship for decades, lies neither solely with Sahra nor solely with the party.”

The fact that this dysfunctional relationship lasted as long as it did was due only to their mutual dependence. Wagenknecht thrived on media attention as a party dissident, while Die Linke avoided even greater losses of resources, mandates, and visibility. At the same time, it became increasingly clear within the party that as long as Wagenknecht and her supporters remained—using Die Linke as a host organism for their own party project—the party’s ability to define itself, govern effectively, acknowledge mistakes, and course-correct was severely compromised.

By the end of 2023, Die Linke was already facing poor political conditions, and the public mood further exacerbated its challenges. In January 2024, Infratest dimap found that around eight in ten Germans felt apprehensive about the year ahead. Only 13 percent expressed optimism about conditions in Germany, while 83 percent felt concerned—a level of pessimism not seen in DeutschlandTREND for nearly 20 years.

A study by the Rheingold Institute for the Identity Foundation in the summer of 2023 reached similar conclusions. Fewer than a quarter of respondents felt a sense of confidence when looking at politics, while one in six felt overwhelmed by the ongoing crises. Two-thirds believed that Germany’s standard of living would have to be adjusted downward, while only one-third trusted that economic conditions would improve.

Faced with a sense of societal “end-times” anxiety, citizens reacted with strategies of denial and retreat into private life:

"Most people block out the war in Ukraine, climate change, or the migration crisis in their daily lives. [...] This creates a curtain of suppression that increasingly separates private life from the public sphere. Only issues directly affecting everyday life—such as inflation, the energy crisis, or the growing division of society—remain in focus. [...] People are primarily concerned with stabilizing their own lives. The most pressing fear is that of losing personal autonomy. The feelings of helplessness experienced at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Ukraine war must not be repeated.” (Rheingold 2023)

Two parties benefited from this climate: the BSW and the AfD.

BSW became the rising star of the 2024 elections. Both in the European elections and the three state elections in eastern Germany, the party—gradually revealing itself as an authoritarian-populist force rather than a leftist one—achieved remarkable results. In 2024, alongside the AfD, the BSW emerged as the second major protest party. A quarter of BSW voters in Thuringia and nearly a third in Brandenburg and Saxony stated that they would have voted for the AfD if BSW had not been on the ballot.

Put simply, the BSW acted as Die Linke’s Death Star. In Thuringia, 52 percent of BSW voters chose the party out of disappointment with other parties. In Saxony and Brandenburg, this figure was even higher—70 percent and 63 percent, respectively—specifically due to frustration with Die Linke (Infratest dimap). BSW performed especially well among voters aged 60 and older—precisely the demographic in which Die Linke suffered the greatest losses.

Meanwhile, the AfD became the strongest party in Thuringia’s state election for the first time. In Brandenburg and Saxony, it secured significant gains, finishing as the second-strongest party. In both Potsdam and Erfurt, the far-right now holds a blocking minority, while in Saxony, it narrowly missed achieving the same by just one seat.

For Die Linke, the 2024 state elections in eastern Germany were a disaster. In Saxony, the party barely clung to parliamentary representation by winning two direct mandates in Leipzig, yet it failed to cross the five-percent threshold, finishing at just 4.5 percent. In Brandenburg, Die Linke—like the Greens and Free Voters—was denied the lifeline of a direct mandate, suffering a nearly eight-point drop and collapsing to 2.98 percent—a blow that would continue to hurt for a long time. Even in Thuringia, its last stronghold, the party was routed. Despite the extreme popularity of Minister President Bodo Ramelow, Die Linke lost nearly 18 percentage points. Few parties in German electoral history had ever experienced such a dramatic collapse.

More than a third of Infratest dimap respondents in Thuringia stated that they believed Die Linke was “no longer needed in German politics.”

Against this backdrop, the Allensbach Institute for Public Opinion Research noted in its FAZ report from September 2024:

"All three parties of the ‘traffic light’ coalition stand to lose heavily in new elections. Together, they currently poll at just 30 percent. The SPD and Greens have lost about one-third of their voters since the last election, while the FDP has lost nearly two-thirds. The Greens, now at just 10 percent, barely remain in double digits, and the FDP risks failing to re-enter the Bundestag. Another clear loser in new elections would be Die Linke, which, following the successful split by the BSW, is on the verge of political irrelevance.”

Federal Election 2025: The Resurgence of the Left

The political landscape between the 2021 and 2025 federal elections changed significantly. Four years ago, the Rheingold Institute described a climate of retreat, resignation, and a profound dilemma of feasibility. People were searching for a strong leader who could guide them out of what felt like an almost unsolvable situation, yet they simultaneously realized that neither the established candidates nor their parties were fully capable of fulfilling this role. The positions of the Greens, FDP, AfD, and Die Linke reflected this ambivalence, culminating in an almost resigned political mood.

In the lead-up to the 2025 election, however, a distinct shift became evident. The Rheingold Election Study 2025 – "What Really Moves Germany" revealed that

"many voters are gripped by a sense of profound loss, worries, and disappointment with politics. The consequences of a faltering economy, misguided migration policies, and crumbling infrastructure are increasingly impacting daily life, creating a sense of being stuck in a deadlock with no way out. [...] The retreat into private comfort zones, which had previously served as a coping mechanism, is no longer effective. Overall, Germany, once seen as a model nation, is now perceived as deteriorating. People feel deeply unsettled and have little confidence that a change in government will improve the situation."

According to the institute, Donald Trump's election in the U.S. not only shifted Germany’s ideal political profile toward a more conservative and sometimes radical direction—captured in the sentiment “Germany First”—but also triggered a form of “fearful fascination” among many voters. Trump’s disruptive and uncompromising style, which aimed to break with the status quo, resonated with those who perceived stagnation as a looming threat.

Once again, in the words of the institute:

"People currently have little confidence that a change in government will make a difference—there is no sense of renewal in the country. Many voters had settled into a kind of 'extra time' in recent years, hoping to stave off an impending era of upheaval and maintain the status quo for a few more months or years.

Now, they fear the end of this extra time. The prevailing sentiment is marked by strong feelings of loss: 'Things will not get better.'

The faltering economy and the recent budget debates have made it clear to voters that there is not enough money available. Tight finances are fueling fears of loss and leading to bitter distributional conflicts.”

According to the FAZ monthly report from the Allensbach Institute in November 2024, 61 percent of respondents did not view Germany’s economic situation as a temporary downturn but rather as a fundamental structural shift threatening entire industries. In 2019, 74 percent still considered Germany’s economic competitiveness a national strength, but by 2024, that figure had dropped to 42 percent. Confidence in Germany as a business location also declined sharply, falling from 66 percent to 35 percent. High energy costs, excessive bureaucracy, and slow approval processes were cited as major disadvantages.

Yet, there was a striking contradiction: while 44 percent of the population believed that Germany had passed its economic peak, personal financial concerns remained relatively low. Only 8 percent of workers feared losing their jobs—a significantly lower figure than during the financial crisis of 2008/09 or in 2005, when up to 38 percent worried about unemployment. At the same time, 57 percent of respondents rated their personal financial situation as good or very good—an even higher figure than in 2019.

This paradoxical public mood had a profound impact on the political assessment of the government. A striking 89 percent of the population believed that politics played a decisive role in economic development, yet 60 percent considered the economic policies of the governing traffic light coalition inadequate. Criticism was particularly severe against the Greens, whom only 2 percent of the population saw as economically competent. The SPD fared only slightly better at 7 percent, while the CDU/CSU was perceived as the most capable party in economic matters, with 31 percent. The Greens’ image as a party detached from economic realities persisted: only 33 percent of their supporters considered a strong economy a central future issue, compared to 55 percent of the general population.

Despite this criticism, economic uncertainty was not the only decisive electoral issue. Migration, internal security, and political stability were equally important. Nonetheless, 55 percent of respondents expected a change in government to positively impact the economy—an unmistakable expression of distrust in the traffic light coalition.

 

Left-Wing Electoral Alternative in the Migration Debate

The 2025 election campaign was not primarily shaped by debates over Germany’s economic or social development but rather by the issue of migration, closely linked to concerns over internal security following attacks in Augsburg, Magdeburg, and other cities. While most parties advocated for more restrictive measures, Die Linke remained committed to its liberal stance on migration and asylum policy. This positioned the party as the only viable option for voters who opposed stricter immigration policies.

It is therefore not surprising that, according to Infratest dimap, 86 percent of those who voted for Die Linke in this election stated: “I support them because they advocate the strongest for a humane asylum and refugee policy.” This view was shared by more than a third (36 percent) of all voters in the 2025 federal election.

 

Key Election Issues

While economic concerns played a significant role in the 2025 federal election, they were not necessarily decisive, as voters did not base their choices solely on their personal financial situations. According to Infratest dimap data, the most influential factors in voters’ decisions were internal security and social security, each cited by 18 percent of respondents. These were followed by immigration and economic growth, both at 15 percent.

Only after these top concerns came environment and climate policy as well as peacekeeping, each at 13 percent. The impact of inflation and rising prices, while notable, played a comparatively minor role, with only 5 percent of voters citing it as their primary concern.

 

The Left’s Key Issue: Social Security

For Die Linke voters, social security was by far the most important factor in their decision, cited by 51 percent (for comparison: SPD 38 percent, Greens 11 percent). Social security was also the most significant issue for 18- to 34-year-old voters, at 19 percent—the demographic that supported Die Linke most strongly in this election.

A total of 47 percent of all voters believed that Die Linke was the party most committed to social equity. This marked a 6 percentage point increase from the 2021 election but remained below the 53 percent recorded in 2017. Among Die Linke’s own voters, an overwhelming 94 percent shared this view.

Trailing far behind as the second most important election issue for Die Linke voters was environment and climate policy (18 percent), followed—again with a significant gap—by internal security (9 percent) and peacekeeping (8 percent, compared to 22 percent for SPD voters).

Despite Die Linke placing strong emphasis on rising prices during the campaign, inflation played only a minor role in voter decisions. It was a key issue for just 5 percent of all voters and 5 percent of Die Linke voters—less than for those who voted for the CDU/CSU (7 percent) or AfD (6 percent), but slightly more than for SPD voters (3 percent).

 

Concerns of Die Linke Voters

According to Infratest dimap, 84 percent of Die Linke voters are worried that democracy and the rule of law are at risk. Almost as many (82 percent) fear that climate change will destroy our way of life.

A majority of 72 percent are concerned about Russia’s growing influence in Europe and that Germany will be defenseless against both Trump and Putin.

Two-thirds (66 percent) of Die Linke voters fear that Germany will not have a stable government after the election.

Social concerns are also widespread:

• 60 percent worry that they will face financial difficulties in old age.
• 60 percent fear a sharp rise in prices that would make it difficult to pay their bills.
• 42 percent are concerned that they will not be able to maintain their current standard of living.

 

Choice for Die Linke: A Choice of Conviction, Not Protest

Across all parties in this federal election, 35 percent of voters made their decision out of disappointment, while 59 percent voted out of conviction, according to Infratest dimap.

However, when comparing Die Linke, the AfD, and BSW, significant differences emerge:

• For Die Linke, only 27 percent of voters chose the party out of disappointment, while 69 percent voted out of conviction.
• Among AfD voters, 39 percent were motivated by disappointment, while 54 percent cast their vote out of conviction—for a far-right party.
• BSW had the highest share of protest voters: 52 percent voted for the party out of disappointment, while 44 percent did so out of conviction.

 

An Alternative for Former SPD and Green Voters

As previously outlined, Die Linke lost more than half of its defecting voters to the SPD and the Greens in the last federal election. This was partly due to the party’s failure to convincingly demonstrate that it was willing to take on governing responsibility in a progressive majority.

In 2025, the governing traffic light coalition—SPD, Greens, and FDP—suffered significant losses. The SPD was hit the hardest, recording its worst post-war election result, while the Greens declined less in percentage terms. The FDP, on the other hand, faced an even more existential threat, with the prospect of falling out of the Bundestag entirely.

Among Die Linke’s own voters, 95 percent agreed with the statement that the party is "a good alternative for those who no longer feel at home in the SPD or the Greens." This view was also shared by 41 percent of all voters, according to Infratest dimap.

As voter migration analysis shows, Die Linke gained approximately 600,000 voters from the Greens and an additional 540,000 voters from the SPD.

 

Die Linke: No longer the Party of East Germans

In 2006, the Sinus-Milieus still identified a group of about 6 percent classified as "East German nostalgics." This demographic, which primarily saw the PDS and later the eastern faction of Die Linke as its political home, has disappeared over the past two decades—along with its relevance as a targetable social group.

In the 2021 federal election, Infratest dimap found that 38 percent of East Germans believed Die Linke was "the party that best represents my interests", the highest percentage among all parties. Since then, however, the party has suffered severe losses.

In the 2025 election, only 19 percent of East Germans still saw Die Linke as their primary political representative—far behind the AfD, which led with 24 percent. Die Linke was followed by the CDU/CSU (12 percent), the SPD (11 percent), and the BSW (8 percent). A significant 19 percent of East Germans stated that no party represented their interests.

However, these percentages do not fully capture the electoral reality in eastern Germany. Die Linke won only four constituencies in the East. The Greens secured Berlin-Pankow and the Berlin-Mitte (East-West) constituency, while Chancellor Olaf Scholz won his district in and around Potsdam.

Apart from these seven exceptions, every other East German constituency was won by the AfD. In Saxony, AfD leader Tino Chrupalla secured more than 50 percent in his district, while in the same state, Maximilian Krah received 45 percent.

The AfD has become the dominant political force in eastern Germany—a de facto Volkspartei.

The New Die Linke

There will undoubtedly continue to be voices on social media referring to Die Linke as the former SED. However, after the 2025 federal election, the party has never been further removed from that past.

This winter, Die Linke experienced a sharp surge in membership, reaching 91,601 members—the highest number since its founding. Between January and December 2025 alone, the party gained 31,276 new members, accounting for one-third of its total membership.

This development builds upon a long-term transformation that I had already analyzed in 2022, though it received little public attention at the time. The departure of the Wagenknecht wing with the BSW has now fully opened the door for what is, in effect, a bottom-up refounding of the party—although its political and strategic implications still need to be fully processed.

A Generational Shift in Membership

Anyone examining Die Linke’s membership data in 2022, as I did back then, would have noted a net loss of nearly 9,000 members over the previous decade (2011: 69,458 members, 2021: 60,670 members). But the shift was far more profound:

• 26,231 members left the party between 2011 and 2021, of whom around 14,500 were aged 60 to 81+. Many of these exits were not politically motivated; rather, family members canceled memberships along with other subscriptions after elderly relatives entered long-term care.
• Over 14,500 members passed away in the same period.
• 31,541 new members joined the party between 2011 and 2021—meaning more than half of Die Linke’s 2022 membership had entered within the past decade.

By the end of 2021, around 21,000 of these newer members were aged 14 to 40, making up one-third of the party's total membership.

Among all non-AfD parties represented in the Bundestag, Die Linke recorded the highest number of member deaths between 2008 and 2019—while also attracting disproportionately many young members.

This generational transition has played out unevenly across different regions:

• In the eastern states, Die Linke experienced steeper membership losses due to historically higher membership numbers.
• In the western states, the party has been growing at a lower absolute level but with a significantly younger membership than in the East.

At the same time, these shifts occurred within broader societal changes, impacting both Die Linke and the milieus that support it.

Low Party Loyalty, High Programmatic Importance

This fundamental transformation in both Die Linke and its social base has had direct implications for the 2025 federal election.

• Only 9 percent of Die Linke voters have a long-term attachment to the party—among the lowest of all parties (only the AfD is lower at 8 percent).
• By comparison: SPD (26 percent), CDU/CSU (18 percent), Greens (16 percent), FDP (14 percent).

However, Die Linke’s program played an outsized role in voter decisions:

• 79 percent of Die Linke voters cited the party’s platform as important for their choice—by far the highest among all parties.
• For comparison: FDP (71 percent), Greens (69 percent), AfD (66 percent), CDU/CSU (58 percent), SPD (52 percent).

This indicates that while long-term loyalty to Die Linke remains low, its policy agenda is a decisive factor for those who vote for it.

 

Who Voted for Die Linke?

Die Linke performed particularly well among young voters and the unemployed. The party's vote share among first-time voters increased by 19 percentage points compared to 2021.

• The 18- to 24-year-olds made up the largest share of Die Linke's electorate, accounting for 27 percent of its votes.
• The 25- to 34-year-old age group contributed 16 percent of its votes.
• Both figures were significantly above the party’s national result of around 9 percent.

Among different occupational groups, striking differences emerged:

• Workers (8 percent) and employees (9 percent) voted for Die Linke at moderate levels.
• The party's highest support came from unemployed voters (12 percent).
• Self-employed voters (6 percent) and retirees (4 percent) showed lower levels of support.

This underscores that Die Linke was mainly supported by those in precarious or less secure employment situations.

Gender and Urban-Rural Divide

• Women (10 percent) were more likely to vote for Die Linke than men (7 percent).
• Infratest dimap compared voting behavior across demographic groups:
  • Among younger women in cities, 35 percent voted for Die Linke, followed by 20 percent for the Greens.
  • Among older men in rural areas, 41 percent voted for CDU/CSU, 19 percent for SPD, and 19 percent for AfD. Only 4 percent of this group supported Die Linke.

These figures confirm that Die Linke's core voter base in 2025 consisted primarily of young people, unemployed individuals, and women.

 

Regional Results

As previously mentioned, Die Linke won six direct mandates in the 2025 federal election. For the first time, Die Linke became the strongest party in both first and second votes in constituency 081, Berlin-Neukölln—a former West Berlin electoral district.

 

Direct Mandates Won by Die Linke – Federal Election 2025
Constituency	Candidate	First Votes	Second Votes
081 Berlin – Neukölln	Ferat Koçak	30,0 %	25,3 %
082 Berlin – Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg – Prenzlauer Berg	Pascal Meiser	34,7 %	31,7 %
083 Berlin – Treptow-Köpenick	Gregor Gysi	41,8 %	21,7 %
085 Berlin – Lichtenberg	Ines Schwerdtner	34,0 %	23,5 %
152 Sachsen – Leipzig II	Sören Pellmann	36,8 %	23,9 %
192 Thüringen – Erfurt – Weimar – Weimarer Land II	Bodo Ramelow	36,8 %	22,1 %
Source: Own compilation based on data from the Federal Returning Officer

 

Once again, a long-term trend in Die Linke’s regional support was confirmed.

• The party’s former strongholds in eastern Germany, which once stood far above western states, have leveled out—except for Berlin.
• The party's performance in Berlin has fluctuated sharply, much like a yo-yo effect before and after a diet (and this is not a reference to opposition or governing politics).
• In 2025, for the first time, Die Linke became the strongest political force in Berlin, winning over 20 percent in both first and second votes.

Performance in Other Regions

• Die Linke’s second-best results came in Thuringia (15 percent) and the western city-states Bremen and Hamburg (both slightly above 14 percent).
• The Hamburg results also suggest a strong showing in the upcoming state election, though due to regional differences, a result of 8-9 percent is expected—similar to the last Hamburg state election.
• In the remaining eastern states (Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Saxony-Anhalt, and Saxony), Die Linke reached around 10 percent.
• Compared to the autumn 2024 state elections, this marked a doubling of support in Brandenburg and Saxony.

The table below shows Die Linke’s percentages in western Germany in the 2025 election.

 

West German Results of Die Linke – Federal Election 2025
State	First Vote	Second Vote
Baden-Württemberg	5,7 %	6,7 %
Bavaria	4,6 %	5,7 %
Hesse	7,2 %	8,7 %
Lower Saxony	6,7 %	8,2 %
North Rhine-Westphalia	6,4 %	7,9 %
Rhineland-Palatinate	5,1 %	6,5 %
Saarland	6,9 %	7,3 %
Schleswig-Holstein	5,9 %	7,2 %
Source: Own compilation based on data from the Federal Returning Officer

 

Voter Migration

The voter migration model from Infratest dimap estimates the scale of voter shifts between parties and the pool of non-voters. As stated on the institute’s website, the model is based on official statistics, representative pre-election and election-day surveys, and preliminary election results. These estimates are updated throughout election night as more counted results are incorporated. The final migration data is published after the official preliminary results are announced.

Based on the 1:00 AM estimate from February 24, 2025, the following trends in voter migration toward and away from Die Linke can be observed:

Voter Gains for Die Linke

• 600,000 voters came from the Greens.
• 540,000 voters switched from the SPD.
• 320,000 former non-voters were mobilized.
• 90,000 voters came from the FDP.
• 60,000 voters came from the CDU/CSU.

Voter Losses for Die Linke

• 100,000 voters switched to the AfD.
• 340,000 voters moved to the BSW.

The BSW, with 4.972 percent of the second votes, appears to be just short of the 5 percent threshold and is likely to miss entering the Bundestag.

All together. Never Alone.

In his analysis of the election night, “A Different Country, A Different Party,” Tom Strohschneider aptly observed:

"That history has a sense of irony is evident in the election results of Die Linke and BSW, whose key figures have now ended up at the very 4.9 percent threshold to which they once pushed their former party through their actions."

In the coming days and weeks, researchers will thoroughly examine the unexpectedly strong performance of Die Linke. Strohschneider notes:

"We will now see the success of the party being attributed to factors that align with whatever analysts already believed was the right approach: focusing on a few core social issues, digital campaign effectiveness, breaking free from Wagenknecht, and thousands of doorstep conversations."

Elsa Koester, deputy editor-in-chief of Freitag, takes a longer historical view in her piece “Guess Who’s Back: Die Linke Is Back Because It Believes in Itself.” She traces the party’s resurgence to a strategic shift that began ten years ago:

"Back in 2016, Die Linke started developing its ‘door-to-door’ campaign strategy and has systematically expanded it ever since. Now, at last, it has worked."

This historical framing, however, risks oversimplification. Reducing the party’s success to one single explanation—"door-to-door campaigning was the key"—misses the broader picture, just as much as the repeated invocation of the Austrian Communist Party’s success model, which—unlike Die Linke—has never expanded beyond its strongholds into the national parliament.

A New Left Party, But Not Without Challenges

The reality is more complex, and here again, Koester’s broader assessment holds true:

"The new Die Linke is taking on responsibility, perhaps more than any other party. It has moved away from populism and turned inward—not in self-absorption, but toward its base and into society itself. Die Linke seems to once again believe in what it says and does. It does not rely on empty slogans, but instead carries with it the hopes, fears, and aspirations of tens of thousands of people in Germany—people it has spoken with. It understands what people need, and that is what shapes its message. Not a university seminar on social inequality. Not a spin doctor. Not a PR consultant. But genuine grassroots anchoring. Die Linke now knows that people need what it stands for—that’s new. And you can feel it.”

At the same time, even this narrative is only part of the truth. Some external factors played a role—circumstances beyond the party’s control.

According to Tom Strohschneider, Die Linke’s success was partly due to a political landscape where it stood out as the only party not echoing the rhetoric of the AfD:

"An echo is not the same as singing in harmony. It is meaningless if CDU, Greens, and AfD become indistinguishable. The issue is that nearly all parties adopted a version of reality that focused almost exclusively on ‘migration problems.’

Against this, Die Linke positioned itself as a party of principles. It was not just its concrete policies on asylum and immigration that resonated, but rather its credibility—its refusal to join the political bandwagon and instead stand firmly on the opposite platform, demonstrating that a different political direction was possible.

This alternative was particularly sought after by former SPD and Green voters. The fact that Die Linke was chosen not only ‘because of’ (its stance on social justice and principle-based politics) but also ‘despite’ (its positions on foreign and security policy) is evident in the testimonies of those who marked their ballots for the party this time.”

Yet new challenges will emerge quickly. Die Linke ran on the slogan: "Everyone wants to govern. We want to change." Now it must prove what kind of change is possible—even from the opposition.

 

Constitutional Amendments: Impossible Without Die Linke

The CDU/CSU, SPD, and Greens no longer hold a two-thirds majority in the Bundestag. For any constitutional amendments, such as reforming the debt brake, they will now need the votes of Die Linke.

Since amending the constitution with AfD votes remains unthinkable, even under Friedrich Merz, Die Linke now holds significant leverage over practical policymaking. The challenge will be to use this influence wisely, avoiding a binary “Reform vs. Revolution” debate.

It is important to distinguish between a simple two-thirds majority (two-thirds of the votes cast) and an absolute two-thirds majority (two-thirds of all Bundestag members).

Key areas where two-thirds majorities are required:

1. Constitutional Amendments – An absolute two-thirds majority (of all Bundestag members) is needed to change the Basic Law.
2. Declaration of a State of Defense – Requires a simple two-thirds majority (of votes cast, but at least an absolute majority of all MPs).
3. Removal of the Chancellor in a Defense Emergency – If Parliament is incapacitated, the Joint Committee can remove the Chancellor with an absolute two-thirds majority.
4. Urgent Legislation – The Bundestag can bypass committee referrals and proceed directly to final readings of a bill with a two-thirds majority of present MPs.
5. Overriding a Bundesrat Veto – In some cases, a two-thirds majority is needed to override opposition from the Bundesrat.

 

Who Are the New Faces?

As Tom Strohschneider points out, this new Die Linke does not automatically inherit the same old problems.

In fact, it might be beneficial if the party’s previous factions—or any remaining ideological camps—took a step back, reflecting on whether they still have a role in this newly emerging political force.

Many old questions must now be reframed, and new questions will arise, rendering old answers obsolete.

Nonetheless, as Strohschneider puts it:

"It is likely that this new Die Linke will soon face some of the same fundamental questions—simply because these are the pressing issues of the moment. These are the same questions that non-party-affiliated leftists will also have to confront. But now, a new political entity is actively searching for answers.

For now, the first challenge of this new party will be to embrace its own newness. Where the old Die Linke once knocked on doors to understand people’s concerns, the new Die Linke must now listen to its own members and ask: Who are we now? What do we want to be? What can and must we be—in this different Germany?”

The 2025 election demonstrated that Die Linke was capable of pulling itself out of "political insolvency" under self-management. This was not a slow recovery, but a radical, uncompromising break from the past.

Relying on past trademarks, slogans, or once-successful strategies is no longer an option. The new Die Linke is no longer trying to sell electronic typewriters in the age of computers. Unlike Olympia Schreibmaschinen Wilhelmshaven, which failed to see the digital revolution coming, this party understands that it must develop a long-term strategy—not just campaign slogans, but a new way of political organizing and grassroots work.

The next step? A foundational process—participatory, inclusive, and based on solidarity—to define the core values that will guide Die Linke into the future.

And perhaps the most decisive shift of all:

Instead of competing for "unique selling points" or attempting to delegitimize its political rivals, this new Die Linke is embracing a plural, progressive vision—one that sees itself as part of a broader coalition for change, rather than as the sole guardian of ideological purity.

This willingness to see progressivism as diversity—not just as an abstract concept, but as a lived reality—is what makes this new Die Linke so compelling.

 

* * *